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STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND (D-SC) ON SENATE FLOOR ON 
JANUARY , 1959~ 
Mr. President: 
I cannot help but feel that the Senate itself, as an institu­
tion, is at this moment under attack and in peril of destruction. 
As is so often the case, the most imminent danger to this, as to 
many other institutions, lies from within rather than from without. 
Surely the proponents of the pending motion do not envisage the 
depth and breadth of their proposal. 
Tradition, in and of itself, is no complete answer to any 
problem. Nevertheless, long-standing traditions are seldom main­
tained without sufficient reason. Almost invariably, traditions 
serve as a warning beacon of obscure, but sound and logical, 
purposes. A beacon of more than 170 years unbroken tradition stands 
as a warning of the seriousness of the proposal before this body. 
Should the motion to proceed to a consideration of the rules be 
favorably considered by this body, this 170-year tradition will 
be destroyed, and regardless of a subsequent return to the same 
method of procedure by this body after sober reflection, the 
tradition will be broken, and the beacon extinguished forever. 
Even more vital, however, are the logical purposes which 
prompted the unshattered existence of this tradition. Foremost 
among these purposes is that of insuring an orderly procedure, so 
vital in such an authoritative body. 
Complaints have been made that this body is not only deliber­
ative, but on occasions, dilatory, when operating under its present 
rules. Yet some of those who voice these complaints would have 
this body declare itself, by an affirmative vote to proceed to 
the adoption of rules, to be a non-continuing body and, therefore, 
without any rules whatsoever. It has been suggested that during 
the interim between this vote and the adoption of new rules by a 
majority vote of this body, that the Senate proceed under "general 
parliamentary law" or, as one self-styled authority suggested, 
under Robert's Rules of Order. I cannot conceive of a more perfect 
example of jumping from the frying pan into the fire than to 
proceed from a disagreement as to what the rules should be, to a 
disagreement on what the rules are, as would be the case if this 
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body attempted to operate under "general parliamentary law", or 
even Robert 9 s Rules of Order. 
The Senate is not an ordinary parliamentary body. Analogies 
to the procedure of other parliamentary bodies have little, if 
any, relevancy to the question before us. For instance, the House 
of Representatives is exclusively a legislative body. The Senate 
is far more. In addition to being a legislative body, it performs, 
by constitutional mandate, both executive and judicial functions. 
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the 
President shall share with the Senate his executive treaty-making 
power and his power of appointment of the officers of the United 
States. Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution requires of 
the Senate a judicial function by reposing in the Senate the sole 
power to try all impeachments. 
The uniqueness of the Senate is not confined, by any means, 
to its variety of . functions. There are innumerable other aspects 
about this body which prevent its orderly operation at any time 
under parliamentary law other than its own rules, adopted in 
accordance with the provisions of those rules. For example, almost 
all parliamentary procedures presuppose that any main question, 
after due notice, can be decided by at least a majority of the 
members of the particular body using the parliamentary procedure. 
Any Senate rules which presupposed such a conclusion would be 
inoperable, for the Constitution itself specifies the necessity 
for two-thirds majority for action an many matters. Among these 
issues requiring a two-thirds majority by constitutional mandate 
are for conviction on impeachment; to expel a member; to override 
a presidential veto; to concur in a treaty; to call a constitutional 
convention; to propose a constitutional amendment to the States 
and to constitute a quorom when the Senate is choosing a Vice­
President. The very fact that each State, regardless of its 
population, has equal representation in this body belies the thought 
of simple majority rule in its deliberation. 
It is this very uniqueness which has compelled so many to 
conclude that the Senate had a degree of continuity unknown to other 
parliamentary bodies. 
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The Founding Fathers themselves, in drafting the Constitution, 
provided for this continuity by establishing a six-year term of 
office for each Senator, so that a minimum of two-thirds of the 
entire body would continue from one session to the next. Had the 
Founding Fathers desired continuity only, but less than a continuing 
body, they could have provided for a staggered term of four years 
for a Senator with one-half of the Senate returning from one . 
session to the next. This would not have provided the necessary 
quorums to do business at all times, and the Senate would not 
have been a continuing body. 
The Senate itself has re-enforced the premise that it is a 
continuing body by the unbroken precedent of continuing its rule 
from one session to the next. In recent years there are two clear­
cut precedents upholding the Senate's status as a continuing body, 
and even more specifically, that its rules continue from one session 
to the next. In 1953 and again in 1957, this body tabled a motion 
that it proceed to take up the adoption of rules for the Senate. 
In 1954, the Senate voted to condemn the late Senator McCarthy 
for his conduct in a previous session. The committee report 
accompanying the resolution stated: "The fact that the Senate is 
a continuing body should require little discussion. This has been 
uniformly recognized by history, precedent and authority." 
In addition, the Senate has jealously maintained its authority 
to continue its committees in their operations between adjournment 
and the commencement of the next ensuing session. The Supreme 
Court in the 1926 case of McGrain v. Daugherty specifically ruled 
that the Senate was a continuing body and, therefore, its committees 
were authorized to act during the recess after the expiration of 
a Congress. 
Is the purpose sought to be accomplished by the drastic action 
proposed so worthy as to justify the risk of stripping the Senate's 
committees of their authority to function after the date of adjourn­
ment? Is it so imperative that it justifies the abandonment of 
orderly procedure for the jungle of "general parliamentary law"? 
The proponents of the pending motion aver that the real 
target of this all-out effort is one, and only one, Senate rule--
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the one which primarily governs the limitation of debate. · This 
much maligned rule has been made the scapegoat by many groups. 
Its greatest distinction, however, appears to be its seclusion 
from objective consideration. 
In the interest of objectivity, let us compare this rule with 
Rule 29, The Previous Qµestion, of the suddenly popular Reuther's 
"Robert's Rules of Order". 
Rule XXII requires a two-thirds vote of the membership to end 
debate on any particular measure, except the rules themselves. 
A parliamentary body acting under "Robert's Rules of Order" can 
end debate and force a vote on the pending question by passing a 
motion of the previous question by a two-thirds majority of those 
present and voting. Even under "Robert's Rules of Order", a 
majority vote, even with notice, cannot end debate. 
The difference, in practical effect, is not overly large. 
For example, had the limitation of debate in the Senate always 
been governed by "The Previous Question" in the present "Robert's 
Rules of Order", no result on previous efforts to invoke clo.ture 
would have been different from the result under the rules as they 
have existed. Had the present Rule XXII of the Senate always 
controlled the limitation of debate, only in one instance would the 
result on cloture attempts have been changed. The particular 
instance to which I refer was a cloture vote which prevailed in 
1927 under a rule requiring a majority of two-thirds of those present 
and voting to end debate. 
The distinction between Rule XXII and ''fhe Previous Question", 
though slight in practical effect, is not without a strong basis 
in reason. "Robert's Rules of Order" was designed for the general 
use of societies, which, not being governmental bodies, have no 
authority to compel attendance of delegates. "Robert's Rules", 
therefore, recognize the impracticality of making the actions of 
those bodies for whom his rules were designed contingent on 
membership. Robert used the most practical basis for his purposes 
for protecting the rights of minorities in societies generally. 
The United States Senate, to understate the matter, occupies 
a greatly different position than the general societies for which 
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"Robert's Rules" was designed. Its membership is under oath to 
support the Constitution and to well and faithfully discharge the 
duties of their offices. Surely a presumption by the rules of 
regular attendance is not unduly harsh. If it be too harsh, why 
has there been no attack on the provision of Rule V which authorizes 
the Sergeant-at-Arms to compel the attendance of absent Senators. 
As far as limitation of debate is concerned, the only dis­
tinction between Rule XXII of the Senate and the rules designed 
for Podunk's local Liar's Club is the pre-supposition by the Senate 
rules of regular attendance of its members. Is this distinction 
too great for what has been called the greatest deliberative body 
on earth? 
Consider what the Senate is being asked to risk in an effort 
to erase this distinction, possibly in favor of a greater distinc­
tion in the other direction. The proponents of the pending motion 
would have the Senate declare itself without rules. My research 
having failed to find the "general parliamentary law" codified, 
presume the Senate would next have to determine temporary rules 
under which to proceed to adopt permanent rules. As I have indi­
cated, Mr. Reuther has recommended "Robert's Rules of Order". It 
is quite possibl~ even probable, that a majority of Senators would 
prefer even temporary rules other than Robert's. There are numerous 
others, such as Parliamentary Procedure, by Rose Marie Grugan; Hand­
book of Parliamentary Procedure, by Henry A. Davidson; Lex 
Parliamentaria Americana, by Luther Stearns Cushing; Manual of 
Parliamentary Practice, by Luther Stearns Cushing; Rules of 
Proceeding and Debate in Deliberative Assemblies, by Luther Stearns 
Cushing; Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons, by 
John Hatsell; A Manual of Parliamentary Practice, by Thomas Jefferson; 
Manual of Legislative Procedure, by Paul Mason. It is even 
conceivable that no one of these or other complete set of rules 
would be acceptable to a majority. Can anyone anticipate the 
confusion which might result from opening such a Pandora's box? 
The Senate could easily spend several months debating and deciding 
on temporary rules. After that would come the more difficult and 
more time consuming task of debating and agreeing on each section 
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of each of the permanent rules. It would be slow work under the 
order provided by our existing rules, but in the jungle in 
which we are urged to jump, it would be almost impossible. 
In the meantime, it behooves us to remember that the existence 
of every committee of the Senate stems from the Senate rules, 
and, therefore, the committees of the Senate would pass with the 
rules. During the succeeding indeterminable period until new 
permanent rules were adopted, our committees would not be working. 
Legislative business would be at a standstill. The emergencies 
of the country, both domestic and foreign, would have to run their 
course while we of the Senate wrangled in an attempt to extricate 
ourselves for the self-made jungle of "general parliamentary 
confusion"r Heaven forbid that we place ourselves in such a 
position. 
Nor would that be the end. Should we so abandon order for 
confusion, a precedent would be set for future Congresses, many 
of which would then want to assert their independence and draft 
their own rules. Each group could flex its muscles and determine 
its gain or loss of strength among new members. It is conceivable 
to me that eventually the first year of each session would have to 
be set aside for the Senate to make its rules under which to act 
on substantive matters during the second year of the session. It 
may be said that this is the wildest sort of speculation--and it is. 
That is just the point. We are asked to sacrifice the traditionally 
orderly procedure of the Senate for something as to the nature of 
which we can only speculate, and I might add, the only guide that 
is offered to limit our speculation is our individual imagination. 
not 
I sincerely hope and trust that the Senate has/degenerated 
to the point at which it will, at one grand sweep, shatter the 
cornerstone. of its existence. It deserves a better fate than 
strangulation in a parliamentary jungle of its own making. 
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